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PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL PROCEDURE-PLEADINGS-AMENDING COM-
PLAINT AFTER RUNNING OF STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-The Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court has held that a broad allegation of negligence
in the original complaint is sufficient to sustain an amendment
containing a more specific allegation of negligence made after the
statute of limitations has expired.
Connor v. Allegheny General Hospital, - Pa. - , 461 A.2d
600 (1983).*
On November 22, 1973, Mary Connor was admitted as an emer-
gency patient to Allegheny General Hospital suffering from ab-
dominal pain and on the morning of November 26, 1973, she un-
derwent a barium enema as part of her diagnostic care.1 During the
procedure, and for some hours following, the barium extravasated
2
into the abdominal cavity through a perforation in the colon.' The
presence in the abdominal cavity of the extravasated barium and
accompanying intestinal contents required emergency surgery."
On October 15, 1975, Mary Connor and her husband, Earl, filed
a complaint in trespass and assumpsit against Allegheny General
Hospital.' The complaint alleged, inter alia, negligence by the hos-
pital individually and acting through its agent, servant, or em-
ployee, in perforating Connor's colon during the enema procedure
thereby permitting extravasation of the barium into the abdominal
* Due to the unavailability of the Connor opinion in the PENNSYLVANIA STATE REPORTS
at the time of publication, citations to this reporter have been omitted.
1. Connor v. Allegheny Gen. Hosp., 461 A.2d 600, 601 (Pa. 1983). Connor was assigned
as a patient to the Chief of Surgery at the hospital but came under the direct care of a
third-year resident in surgery. The barium procedure was performed by a second-year resi-
dent in Radiology. Brief for Appellant at vii, Connor v. Allegheny Gen. Hosp., 461 A.2d 600
(Pa. 1983). A barium enema is the administration of barium, a radiopaque medium, for x-
ray study of the lower intestinal tract. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 446 (5th Unabridged
Lawyer's Edition 1982).
2. A discharge or escape, as of blood, from a vessel into the tissues. DORLAND'S ILLUS-
TRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 561 (25th ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as DORLAND'S].
3. 461 A.2d at 601.
4. Connor v. Allegheny Gen. Hosp., 300 Pa. Super. 321, 323, 446 A.2d 635, 636 (1982),
rev'd, 461 A.2d 600 (Pa. 1983). Connor was taken to Radiology to undergo the barium enema
at 8:50 a.m.; the surgery to remove the barium was begun at approximately 11:50 p.m. the
same day. Brief for Appellant at vii-viii, Connor.
5. 461 A.2d at 601. The complaint alleged, in part, that Earl Connor had been dam-
aged, inter alia, in that he would be required to spend further sums for his wife's medical
expenses, and he would be deprived of her services, assistance and companionship. Repro-
duced Record at 8a-9a, Connor v. Allegheny Gen. Hosp., 461 A.2d 600 (Pa. 1983).
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cavity thus causing barium peritonitis,' and "[i]n otherwise failing
to use due care and caution under the circumstances."
'7
On November 28, 1977, the case was called to trial' but was
postponed because the plaintiff's expert refused to testify, citing
his lack of expertise in this area of medicine. 9 The Connors ob-
tained a new expert who stated that the extravasation of the bar-
ium was caused by a perforation of a diverticulum, 10 but that he
was unable to determine whether the diverticulum had perforated
prior to or during the barium enema procedure." The report which
6. Reproduced Record at 6a, Connor. Peritonitis is an inflammation of the peritoneum
(a membrane lining the abdominal walls) which is attended by abdominal pain and tender-
ness, constipation, vomiting and moderate fever. DORLAND'S at 1168. A report made by Dr.
Joseph A. Marasco, Jr., then Director of Diagnostic Radiology at St. Francis General Hospi-
tal, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, was filed with the defendant-hospital's pre-trial statement.
This report stated Marasco's opinion that barium does not cause acute peritonitis and that
any acute peritonitis which was present in this case was caused by the usual intestinal con-
tents which accompanied the barium through the perforation. Reproduced Record at 40a,
Connor.
7. 461 A.2d at 601. The complaint alleged, among other things, that the hospital was
negligent in perforating the sigmoid colon during the performance of the barium enema
procedure, thus causing extravasation of the barium into the abdominal cavity resulting in
barium peritonitis, and "[i]n otherwise failing to use due care and caution under the cir-
cumstances" (emphasis added). The complaint further alleged that as a result of the negli-
gence of the hospital in perforating Connor's colon, she was required to have surgery to close
the perforation and remove the barium; to undergo surgery to drain an abscess in the ab-
dominal cavity; and to undergo surgery for a left colectomy (excision of a portion of the
colon), a coloproctostomy (surgical creation of a new opening between the colon and rec-
tum), a left oophorectomy (removal of the left ovary), and repair and removal of adhesions
(fibrous bands or structures by which parts abnormally adhere) caused by the extravasation
of the barium. Reproduced Record at 6a-7a, Connor. See generally, DORLAND'S.
8. 461 A.2d at 601. The Connors had filed a pre-trial statement on February 22, 1977,
including a report from Cyril H. Wecht, M.D., in which he stated that Connor had suffered
a perforation of the colon and extravasation of the barium as a result of the performance of
the barium enema. 300 Pa. Super. at 323, 446 A.2d at 636. The court quoted Wecht's report
as stating that this is "a quite unexpected and dangerous condition, and one which does not
ordinarily occur if a barium enema is performed properly and carefully." 461 A.2d at 601.
9. 461 A.2d at 601 & n.1. The court stated that although the record was apparently
silent on this point, Dr. Wecht's refusal to testify was apparently based on a rule of the
Pennsylvania Medical Society which calls for dismissal of member physicians from the Soci-
ety if they testify as experts for plaintiffs in malpractice cases outside their area of exper-
tise. Id. at 601 n.1.
10. A diverticulum is a circumscribed pouch or sac of variable size occuring normally
or created by herniation of the lining mucous membrane through a defect in the muscular
coat of a tubular organ. DORLAND'S at 469.
11. 461 A.2d at 601. The new expert's report also stated that perforation may occur as
a result of diverticulitis (inflammation of a diverticulum; a condition marked by the forma-
tion of small pouches along the border of the colon, which become filled with feces which
sometimes set up irritation and give rise to inflammation and abscess. DORLAND's at 469.).
Reproduced Record at 42a, Connor. This report was attached to the Supplemental Pre-Trial
Statement which was filed by Connor on February 8, 1979. 300 Pa. Super. at 323, 446 A.2d
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the new expert submitted stated, however, his opinion that there
was undue delay on the part of the radiologist in making a diagno-
sis of the perforation and in performing surgery on a patient with
perforation and acute peritonitis.1"
The case was again called for trial, and on November 26, 1979,
the Connors filed a motion to amend their complaint,1 3 setting
forth different allegations of the hospital's negligence which in-
cluded a failure to recognize and promptly treat the barium extrav-
asation."1 This motion to amend was denied by the trial judge in
common pleas court.15 Allegheny General Hospital then filed a mo-
tion for summary judgment which was granted, and the case was
dismissed.16
The appeal by the Connors to the superior court alleged, in part,
that the lower court erred in denying the motion to amend their
complaint and in dismissing the complaint. The superior court,
at 637.
12. Reproduced Record at 43a, Connor.
13. 461 A.2d at 601-02. The Connors had made a prior Motion to Amend the Com-
plaint which was denied on November 9, 1979, without prejudice to their right to present
that motion at trial. This first motion included an allegation of negligence pursuant to the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323(a) (1976) which states in pertinent part:
Negligent Performance of Undertaking to Render Services.
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another
which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of the other's person or
things, is subject to liability to the other for physical harm resulting from his failure
to exercise reasonable care to perform his undertaking, if
(a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such harm . . .
Id. The original motion to amend the complaint was not reasserted in the second motion
and the order denying it was never appealed. 461 A.2d at 601 n.2.
14. 461 A.2d at 601-02. The second motion proposed to amend the complaint by
adding:
After it became apparent or should have become apparent to the radiology resident
... and ... the resident surgeon, that barium with accompanying intestinal con-
tents had extravasated into the abdominal cavity, the necessary laparotomy and
cleansing of the abdominal cavity . . . was delayed improperly causing the barium
and intestinal contents to remain within the abdominal cavity causing extensive peri-
tonitis, formation of adhesions and a pericolic abscess.
Reproduced Record at 48a, Connor. A pericolic abscess is a collection of pus in a cavity
formed by the disintegration of tissues around the colon. See generally DORLAND'S.
15. 461 A.2d at 602. All parties and the trial court agreed that without the proposed
amendment, the testimony by the new expert could not sustain the cause of action under
the original complaint because of the new expert's opinion that there was no evidence that
the barium enema tip caused the perforation of the colon, as alleged in the Connors' original
complaint. The Connors' counsel declined to proceed with the trial and both counsel and
the court agreed that the court would enter a non-suit. Counsel for the Connors failed to
prepare the necessary materials for submission of the case on a case stated basis and the
hospital filed a motion for summary judgment. 300 Pa. Super. at 324, 446 A.2d at 637-39.
16. 461 A.2d at 602.
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Judge Johnson, speaking for the majority, affirmed summary judg-
ment for the defendant, holding that the proposed amendment to
the Connors' complaint was barred by the statute of limitations
since it "sought to add new allegations of negligent acts by pro-
ceeding on a different theory.' 1 7 Judge Johnson stated that the
proposed amendment clearly involved new and different acts of
negligence which occurred after the acts of negligence alleged in
the original complaint.' s
In his superior court dissent, Judge Cirillo looked to the purpose
of the pleadings-that they are to define issues and give notice to
the opposing party of what the pleader intends to prove at trial so
that the opposition may prepare to meet such proof with its own
evidence.' 9 Judge Cirillo took into account that the original com-
plaint stated not only that the hospital was negligent in perforat-
ing the colon, but that the hospital also failed to use due care and
caution under the circumstances, 0 and, as such, the amended com-
plaint did not change the cause of action and should therefore be
allowed. 21 Additionally, Judge Cirillo observed that the facts al-
leged in the proposed amendment were part of a causally related
chain of events which occurred on the same day, November 26,
1973, and at the same place, Allegheny General Hospital, which
suggested, therefore, that the hospital had notice of the events
from the very day they occurred and would not have been
prejudiced in its defense by the amended complaint. 22
The Connors appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,
17. 300 Pa. Super. at 323-26, 446 A.2d at 636-38.
18. Id. at 327, 446 A.2d at 638. The majority declared that the alleged negligence in
perforating the colon and thus permitting extravasation of barium into the abdominal cavity
is distinct in theory from the allegations of failing to properly remedy the extravasation and
failing to promptly perform corrective surgery. The majority also ruled that since there re-
mained no issue of material fact that could be proven pursuant to the allegations in the
original complaint, the hospital was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 327-28,
446 A.2d at 639.
19. 300 Pa. Super. at 329, 446 A.2d at 639 (Cirillo, J., dissenting). See infra note 48
and accompanying text.
20. 300 Pa. Super. at 329, 446 A.2d at 639 (Cirillo, J., dissenting). See supra note 7.
21. 300 Pa. Super. at 329, 446 A.2d at 640 (Cirillo, J., dissenting). See 5 STANDARD
PENNSYLVANIA PRACTICE 2n § 24:44 which states:
Even where the statute of limitations has run, the plaintiff may amend his pleading
to aver additional facts which particularize and render his complaint more explicit,
and give a more detailed statement of the facts constituting the basis of his claim,
provided he confines himself to a substantial restatement of the cause of action origi-
nally stated.
Id.
22. 300 Pa. Super. at 330, 446 A.2d at 640 (Cirillo, J., dissenting).
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which reversed the superior court decision on April 27, 1983, and
remanded the case for further proceedings.2 s The supreme court
held that since the proposed amendment did not change the origi-
nal cause of action, but merely amplified it, it would not constitute
prejudice to the defendants and it was therefore an abuse of judi-
cial discretion for the trial court to refuse to grant the
amendment. 4
The court noticed, as did Judge Cirillo in his superior court dis-
sent, that the original complaint did not merely allege that the
barium enema had been negligently performed, but that the hospi-
tal was negligent "[i]n otherwise failing to use due care and cau-
tion under the circumstances. ' ' 2 The court viewed the proposed
amendment as simply specifying other ways in which the hospital
was negligent.2 The court followed the policy that the right to
amend a complaint should be liberally granted at any stage of the
proceedings,27 and then adhered to the rule that if the proposed
amendment does not change the cause of action, but merely ampli-
fies it, the amendment should be allowed, even though the statute
of limitations has already run.28
23. 461 A.2d at 601. Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Nix, Larsen, Flaherty, McDer-
mott, Hutchinson and Zappala heard the case. Justice Larsen wrote the majority opinion,
while Chief Justice Roberts wrote a concurring opinion and Justice Nix wrote a dissenting
opinion. Id.
24. 461 A.2d at 602. See 5 STANDARD PENNSYLVANIA PRACTICE 2D § 24:4 ("In those
instances in which court approval is required for an amendment of the complaint. . . the
allowance of amendments is within the discretion of the lower court. This discretion, how-
ever, is a judicial discretion and can be reviewed on appeal, but will not be disturbed on
appeal except in case of an evident abuse thedreof, or unless the appellant shows affirma-
tively that he was prejudiced by the ruling."). See also Man O'War Racing Ass'n, Inc. v.
State Horse Racing Comm'n, 433 Pa. 432, 250 A.2d 172 (1969), where the court said: "An
abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment, but if in reaching a conclusion the
law is overridden or misapplied or the judgment, exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or
the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, as shown by the evidence or the record,
discretion is abused." Id. at 451 n.10, 250 A.2d at 181 n.10.
25. 461 A.2d at 602. See supra note 7.
26. 461 A.2d at 602.
27. Id. See 5 STANDARD PENNSYLVANIA PRACTrIcE 2D § 24:3 ("Accordingly, the generally
recognized rule is that amendments will be allowed with great liberality at any stage of the
case provided they do not violate the law or prejudice the rights of the opposing party so as
to secure a determination of the cases on their merits whenever possible."). See, e.g., West
Penn Power Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 236 Pa. Super. 413, 433, 348 A.2d 144, 155 (1975),
where the court said: "[T]he general rule is that amendments to a pleading are to be liber-
ally allowed and may be made at any point in the litigation."; Schaffer v. Larzelere, 410 Pa.
402, 406-07, 189 A.2d 267, 270 (1963), in which the court stated: "[T]he right to amend
should be liberally granted at any stage of the proceedings unless there is an error of law or
resulting prejudice to an adverse party .... " See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
28. 461 A.2d at 602. See supra note 21. See also note 64 and accompanying text.
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In determining whether the hospital was prejudiced by the pro-
posed amendment, Justice Larsen, speaking for the majority,29 ob-
served in a footnote to the opinion, that if the hospital was una-
ware of how it "failed to use due care and caution under the
circumstances" 30 it had two options-it could have filed a prelimi-
nary objection in the nature of a request for a more specific plead-
ing, or one in the nature of a motion to strike that portion of the
Connors' complaint.3' Having failed to do either, Justice Larsen
submitted, the defendant could not claim that it had been
prejudiced by the late amplification of this particular allegation of
the Connors' complaint.3 2
Chief Justice Roberts, in a concurring opinion, supported the
majority on the grounds that the original complaint provided am-
ple notice of the theory which the Connors sought to pursue in the
proposed amendment to the complaint.3
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Nix stated that while it is true
that amendment to pleading should be liberally granted,3 4 an
29. 461 A.2d at 601.
30. See supra note 7.
31. 461 A.2d at 602 n.3. Rule 1017(b) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure
states that preliminary objections are available to any party and are limited to, among
others, a motion to strike off a pleading because of lack of conformity to law or rule of court
or because of scandalous or impertinent matter, and a motion for a more specific pleading.
32. 461 A.2d at 602 n.3. See King v. Brillhart, 271 Pa. 301, 114 A. 515 (1921), in which
the court said:
[Tihe [plaintiff's statement] may not be such a statement, in a concise and summary
form, of the material facts upon which the plaintiffs relies . . . but, if not, it was
waived by the defendant's affidavit to, and going to trial upon the merits. . . . [A]
defendant may move to strike off an insufficient statement, or if it is too indefinite,
may obtain a rule for one more specific. Failing to do either, he will not be entitled to
a compulsory nonsuit because of the general character of the plaintiff's statement.
Id. at 305, 114 A. at 516. Goodrich-Amram states that a failure to object preliminarily will
be considered an irrevocable waiver of the defenses and objections of indefiniteness or lack
of particularity in the opponent's pleading. GOODRICH-AMRAM 2D § 1032:2. According to the
Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure:
A party waives all defenses and objections which he does not present either by pre-
liminary objection, answer or reply, except
(1) that the defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the
defense of failure to join an indispensable party, and the objection of failure to state a
legal defense to a claim may also be made by a later pleading, if one is permitted, or
by motion for judgment on the pleadings or at the trial on the merits, and,
(2) that whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court
lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter or that there has been a failure to join an
indispensable party, the court shall dismiss the action.
PA. R. Civ. P. 1032. See infra notes 98-104 and accompanying text.
33. 461 A.2d at 603 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
34. 461 A.2d at 603 (Nix, J., dissenting). See Rule 126 of the Pennsylvania Rules of
Civil Procedure which states in part: "The rules shall be liberally construed to secure the
792
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amendment introducing a new cause of action will not be permit-
ted after the statute of limitations has run.35 Justice Nix then ob-
served that the proposed amendment in this case could not be a
mere amplification of the complaint because the proposed change
made the act causing the harm one of omission rather than one of
commission.36 He argued that since the proof required to defend
the newly alleged facts was different from that necessary to defend
the original complaint, it resulted in prejudice to the adverse
party.
37
just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding to which they are
applicable," PA. R. Civ. P. 126; and Wilson v. Howard Johnson Restaurant, 421 Pa. 455, 219
A.2d 676 (1966) (where the original complaint was based on negligence in permitting ice to
form on the sidewalk and the proposed amendment alleged negligence in maintaining a
fence next to the sidewalk because the defendant knew or should have known that anyone
falling would have been injured by the fence). See also supra note 27.
35. 461 A.2d at 603 (Nix, J., dissenting). See 2B ANDERSON PENNSYLVANIA CPViL PRAC-
TiCE § 1033.27 which states:
In the case of a pleading asserting a cause of action, the right to amend is subject to
the qualification that an amendment cannot be made after the period of the Statute
of Limitations has expired if the amendment introduces a new cause of action which
would be barred by the statute.
Id.
In making its decision in the Connor case, the superior court declared that the purpose of
the generally held rule prohibiting amendments which introduce a new cause of action after
the statute of limitations has run is to prevent prejudice to the adverse party. 300 Pa.
Super. at 325, 446 A.2d at 637. See also 5 STANDARD PENNSYLVANIA PRACTICE 2D § 24:41
("[t]he criterion for determining whether or not an amendment may be made after the stat-
ute of limitations has run is whether the defendant will be prejudiced by the amendment or
whether the cause of action is changed thereby"); GOODRICH-Asnum 2D § 1033:4.1 ("an
amendment filed, after the statute of limitations has run, introducing a new cause of action,
is clearly prejudicial to the defendant and is not permitted"). GooDmcH-Amam 2D §
1033:4.1 also states that "[a] new cause of action exists if it is based on an entirely different
theory, or charges a different kind of negligence or is based upon different relations between
the parties. Under such circumstances both the plaintiff's proof and the defenses available
to the defendant would be different." Id. In Junk v. East End Fire Dep't, 262 Pa. Super.
473, 491, 396 A.2d 1269, 1278 (1978), the court said, "One of the primary reasons for disal-
lowing amendments which create new causes of action after the running of the statute of
limitations is to prevent prejudice to the adverse party." Id.
Judge Johnson, speaking for the superior court majority in Connor, stated that Allegheny
General Hospital would have been prejudiced by the proposed amendment since the amend-
ment was not made until the date of trial and it would have required a different defense to
be presented at trial. Judge Johnson stated that by "this point in time, many of the deposi-
tions had already been taken, and a defense prepared on the allegations found in the origi-
nal complaint .... Appellee would have been prejudiced in its attempt to defend against
allegations of negligence not incorporated in the pleadings until the date of trial." 300 Pa.
Super. at 326, 446 A.2d at 638.
36. 461 A.2d at 603 (Nix, J., dissenting).
37. Id. According to Professor James:
[Tlhere are several ways in which lateness or delay (in amendments] may cause
prejudice. . . .If the Amendment is sought on the eve of trial or at trial, the oppo-
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Justice Nix further argued that the "boiler-plate allegation of
negligence,""e which the majority used to substantiate its decision,
defeated the purpose of the statute of limitations" and frustrated
the objectives of the fact pleading system.40 Justice Nix also fol-
lowed the generally held rule that the decision to grant or deny
permission to amend is within the discretion of the trial court and
should only be reversed upon a clear abuse of that discretion." He
declared that since there was no such abuse here, the decision of
the superior court should not be reversed. 2
The Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure provide for fact
pleading, as distinguished from the notice pleading upon which the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are based.43 Under notice plead-
ing, the plaintiff need not plead every fact essential to his right to
recover, it is enough that the opposing party be apprised of the
nent may be deprived of a reasonable chance to prepare his case against it unless he
is granted a postponement or continuance at trial . . [the continuance] may ...
bring with it other evils, such as further delay of the case and concomitant
expense. .. "
FLEMING JAMES, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE 158 (1965).
38. 461 A.2d at 604 (Nix, J., dissenting).
39. 2 STANDARD PENNSYLVANIA PRACTICE 2D § 13:2 states:
Statutes of limitation are declaratory of the principle of the common law that the law
lends its aid only to those who exercise diligence in invoking it. They are expressive
of the feelings of mankind that wrongs should be redressed and rights enforced with-
out unreasonable delay. Their purpose is to stimulate diligence in looking after rights
and in instituting litigation while evidence is living, fresh, and at hand, and thus
avoid the uncertainties which attend investigation of aged controversies. The primary
consideration underlying statutes of limitations it to expedite litigation and to pre-
clude long delays that would be prejudicial to the person against whom the action is
brought.
Id. This section states further that, "[i]t has been said that the hardships which may result
from the strict enforcement of the statute are nothing when compared with the mischiefs
which would ensue by evading its provisions." Id.
40. 461 A.2d at 604 (Nix, J., dissenting). See infra note 46 and accompanying text.
41. 461 A.2d at 604 (Nix, J., dissenting). See Geiman v. Board of Assessment and
Revision of Taxes, 412 Pa. 609, 195 A.2d 352 (1963) (where a request for leave to amend was
made almost five months after entry of the decree dismissing the complaint and almost four
months subsequent to the filing of exceptions thereto, there was no abuse of discretion).
According to 5 STANDARD PENNSYLVANIA PRACTICE 2D § 24:4, in those instances in which
court approval is required for an amendment of the complaint, the allowance of amend-
ments is within the discretion of the lower court. This discretion, however, may be reviewed
on appeal, but not disturbed except in the case of evident abuse. Id. See also supra note 24.
42. 461 A.2d at 604 (Nix, J., dissenting).
43. Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 1019(a), provides: "The material facts
on which a cause of action or defense is based shall be stated in a concise and summary
form." See 3 STANDARD PENNSYLVANIA PRACTICE 2D § 16:1, which states that the Pennsylva-
nia Rules of Civil Procedure retain the fact pleading system of the Practice Acts.
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nature of the claim which is asserted." The fact pleading system of
Pennsylvania is designed to compel a concise, orderly statement of
the ultimate or "material facts" so as to expedite litigation.45 Pri-
marily, the purpose of the fact pleading system is to give fair no-
tice to the defendant of what will confront him at trial so that he
may have an opportunity to prepare a defense.""
Although Pennsylvania no longer utilizes a strict fact pleading
system in which every fact must appear in the complaint,47 the
purpose of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure is to require
the pleader to disclose the material facts sufficient to enable the
adverse party to prepare his case.4' The Rules provide that "[t]he
material facts on which a cause of action or defense is based shall
be stated in a concise and summary form."4 " This rule is satisfied if
the pleading contains averments of all the facts which the plaintiff
44. See Conley v. Green, 355 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1957), in which the Court said: "[Tihe
Federal Rules ...do not require a claimant to set out in detail the facts upon which he
bases his claim.. . . [All the Rules require is. . .that [plaintiff's complaint] will give the
defendant fair notice .of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests. . . ." Id. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that a pleading shall contain a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. FED. R.
Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
45. See GOODRICH-AMRAM 2D § 1019:1. See also 4 STANDARD PENNSYLVANIA PRACTICE
2D § 21:26 which states that "[t]his fact pleading system requires parties to exchange plead-
ings precise and concise enough to inform all who read them what the plaintiff claims and
the basis of the claim." Id.
46. See 3 STANDARD PENNSYLVANIA PRACTICE 2D § 16:2 which states, in part: "[T]he
primary purpose of pleading is to form a clear and distinct issue for the trial of the cause
between the parties." Id. See also GOODRICH-AmRAM 2D § 1019:1 which states: "The fact
pleading system is designed to compel a concise orderly statement of the ultimate facts, so
that litigation will be expedited, and the parties will not be forced 'to depositions in all
cases'" Id. and GOODRICH-AMRAM 2D § 1019(a):2.
47. See 4 STANDARD PENNSYLVANIA PRACTICE 2D § 21:26: "Although Pennsylvania is no
longer a strict fact pleading state in which every fact must appear in the complaint, the
purpose of Rule 1019(a) is to require the pleader to disclose the material facts sufficient to
enable the adverse party to prepare his case." Id. See also supra note 43.
48. 4 STANDARD PENNSYLVANIA PRACTICE 2D § 21:4 states:
The primary function of a complaint is to set forth the plaintiff's cause of action. It
also should inform the defendant with reasonable accuracy, of the nature and extent
of the plaintiff's claim, and set forth concisely the material and issuable facts on
which the plaintiff relies for his claim. Since the very purpose of the complaint is to
set forth facts which show a claim "enforceable" by action, it necessarily fails of this
purpose unless those facts are averred.
Id. See also GOODRICH-AMRAm 2D § 1019:1 ("[tjhe function of pleading is to put the oppo-
nent on notice of what he will be called upon to meet at trial, and to define the issues which
will be tried"); 3 STANDARD PENNSYLVANIA PRACTICE 2D § 16.2 ("[t]he most important func-
tion of a pleading is to exhibit to the court, not only the facts which constitute the cause of
action, but which of those facts are controverted, in order to facilitate the administration of
justice by simplifying the grounds of controversy").
49. PA. R. Civ. P. 1019. See supra note 43.
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will eventually have to prove in order to recover and if the aver-
ments are sufficiently specific so as to enable the party served to
prepare a defense. 0 The test of whether a complaint is sufficiently
specific in its averments is whether it reasonably informs the de-
fendant of the facts which he must be prepared to meet at trial.5 '
If the complaint does not contain facts specific enough to state a
cause of action, the defendant may make a motion for a more spe-
cific pleading 2 or a motion for judgment on the pleadings. 3
The severity of the penalty for failure to conform to the require-
ments of the fact pleading system is tempered by Rule 1033 of the
Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure,54 and by the courts' policy
of granting liberal amendments. 5 Rule 1033 provides that a party
may at any time, by leave of court, amend his pleading."' It also
provides that the amended pleading may aver transactions which
occurred before or after the filing of the complaint even though
they give rise to a new cause of action. 7 This rule has, however,
been modified by case law to the extent that the courts will not
50. See, e.g., Socha v. Metz, 385 Pa. 632, 641-42, 123 A.2d 837, 842 (1956): "[Tjhe
intended role of a pleading is to forecast what the pleader hopes to prove at trial, thereby
putting his opponent on notice of what the latter will have to meet."; Baker v. Rangos, 229
Pa. Super. 333, 349, 324 A.2d 498, 505 (1974): "A complaint.., must do more than 'give
the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests'
.... It should formulate the issues by fully summarizing the material facts."
51. See Commonwealth, Dept. of Transp. v. Shipley Humbel Oil Co., 29 Pa. Commw.
171, 173, 370 A.2d 438, 439 (1977), in which the court said:
A pleading must achieve the purpose of informing the court and the adverse party or
parties of the matters in issue. Rule 1019(a) is satisfied if allegations in a pleading (1)
contain averments of all facts the plaintiff will eventually have to prove in order to
recover, and (2) they are sufficiently specific so as to enable the party served to
prepare a defense thereto.
Id. (emphasis in original). See also GOODRICH-AMRAM 2D § 1019:1 and 61A AM. JUR. 2D
Pleading § 32 ("the usual test of the sufficiency of a declaration, complaint, or petition is
that it should state the cause of action with such a reasonable degree of certainty as will
give fair notice to defendant of the character of the claim or demand made against him so as
to enable him to prepare for his defense").
52. See PA. R. Civ. P. 1017(b), supra note 31.
53. PA. R. Civ. P. 1034
54. PA. R. Civ. P. 1033. This rule states:
A party, either by filed consent of the adverse party or by leave of court, may at any
time change the form of action, correct the name of a party or amend his pleading.
The amended pleading may aver transactions or occurrences which have happened
before or after the filing of the original pleading, even though they give rise to a new
cause of action of defense. An amendment may be made to conform the pleading to
the evidence offered or admitted.
Id.
55. See supra note 27.
56. See supra note 54.
57. Id.
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permit amendments to a complaint which would create a new
cause of action after the statute of limitations has run in favor of a
defendant.8
In Schaffer v. Larzelere59 the plaintiff, as administrator of the
estate of Margaret Stuchko, filed a complaint alleging that the de-
fendant-hospital was the cause of Stuchko's death in that it care-
lessly and prematurely released the decedent after she had been
admitted for treatment of injuries suffered in a beating.60 At the
time of the filing of the complaint, the one-year statute of limita-
tions had already run in favor of the defendant. 1 In response to
the defendant-hospital's motion for judgment on the pleadings, the
plaintiff made a motion to amend which would have added the al-
legations that the plaintiff could not have gained knowledge of the
defendant's negligence prior to the running of the statute of limita-
tions because the facts constituting negligence were solely within
the defendant's knowledge and that the defendant had deliberately
concealed the circumstances surrounding the cause of death.62 The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in rendering its decision, stated that
an amendment introducing a new cause of action would not be per-
mitted after the statute of limitations had run because it would
constitute resulting prejudice to the adverse party.6 3 The court
then added that if the proposed amendment did not change the
cause of action but merely amplified that which had already been
averred, it would be allowed, even though the statute of limitations
had already run. 4 The Schaffer court viewed the proposed amend-
ments as amplifications since they did not allege any further acts
of negligence but only more specifically explained why the statute
was tolled for the purpose of prosecution of the originally pleaded
cause of action.""
A later Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision, Laursen v. Gen-
eral Hospital of Monroe County,6 followed the ruling set down in
58. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. See also infra notes 59-65 and accom-
panying text, and Kuisis v. Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp., 457 Pa. 321, 319 A.2d 914 (1974)
(permitting amendment where the original complaint alleged a defect in the crane's mecha-
nism and the amendment alleged a defect in design or manufacturing of the crane).
59. 410 Pa. 402, 189 A.2d 267 (1963).
60. Id. at 404, 189 A.2d at 269.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 407, 189 A.2d at 270.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. 494 Pa. 238, 431 A.2d 237 (1981).
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Schaffer and permitted an amendment where the original com-
plaint alleged that the physician's and the hospital's negligence oc-
curred as of the date of admission to the hospital and the amend-
ment listed specifically dates occurring between the date of
admission to the hospital and a period of treatment ending six
months later.6 7 The court permitted the amendment because the
plaintiff would still have to rely on the specified acts of negligence
averred in his original complaint.0 8 The court stated that allowing
the amendment would not be allowing a new cause of action to be
stated because no new negligent act or acts which occasioned the
injury would be alleged. 9 The only difference would be the dates
of those acts already averred and, therefore, according to Schaffer,
this would be an amplification of the original cause of action, not a
new cause of action.
70
The pivotal question in Connor, as in Schaffer and Laursen, is
whether an amendment constitutes an amplification to an already
averred cause of action, or whether it constitutes an new cause of
action. 71 Amplification exists where the amendment merely partic-
ularizes the complaint or makes the complaint more specific with-
out changing the basis of the complaint.7 2 The basis for making the
determination of what constitutes a new cause of action within the
Pennsylvania fact pleading system is grounded on whether the
complaint contains all the material facts necessary to state a
claim 78 and whether it states those facts in a clear fashion so that




71. See Junk v. East End Fire Dep't, 262 Pa. Super. 473, 396 A.2d 1269 (1978), infra
note 82 and accompanying text, where the court defined a new cause of action as a different
theory or different kind of negligence, or a change in the operative facts supporting the
claim. See also Cox v. Wilkes-Barre Railways Corp., 334 Pa. 568, 570, 6 A.2d 538, 538 (1939)
and Martin v. Pittsburgh Railways Co., 227 Pa. 18, 20, 75 A. 837, 837 (1910) where each of
these courts said that a cause of action in negligence has been defined as "the negligent act
or acts which occasioned the injury"; and GOODRICH-AMRAM 2D § 1033:4.1. For a different
view see Kuisis v. Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp., 457 Pa. 321, 319 A.2d 914 (1974), where
the court said: "This court has never adopted a comprehensive definition of what consti-
tutes a cause of action, for the excellent reason that no such definition exists." Id. at 325
n.7, 319 A.2d at 918 n.7.
72. See supra note 21.
73. See GOODRICH-AMRAM 2D § 1019(a):2 which states: "The requirement that material
facts be pleaded is both directory and limiting. It is directory in the sense that it requires
the ultimate facts and all the ultimate facts which are essential to the claim be pleaded." Id.
See also supra note 47.
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the defendant may prepare a defense to the allegations. 4 The
courts have never made a clear determination of what, precisely, is
a fact. Material facts have been defined as "those which are essen-
tial to show the liability which is sought to be enforced. 7 The
Pennsylvania courts have defined "material facts" to be "ultimate
facts," i.e., those facts essential to support the claim. 6 They have
also, however, admitted that the criteria for determining the essen-
tial material facts are incapable of precise measurement." These
definitions do not, in any way, create a clearer understanding of
the phrase "material facts."
The Connor court faced the very problem of what constitutes a
fact and whether the complaint contained all the facts necessary
for the defendant to prepare its defense to the allegations. The
specific question in the case was whether the plaintiffs' allegation
"in otherwise failing to use due care and caution under the circum-
stances" was sufficient to provide the defendant with notice of
what he would have to defend,78 and the answer lay with the inter-
pretation of that phrase. The interpretation controversy is clearly
evidenced in that both the majority and the dissent in Connor
used Laursen to shore up their positions.79 The majority used
Laursen to support its conclusion that the proposed amendment
should be permitted because it was an amplification of an already
averred fact,80 whereas Justice Nix's dissent used the same case to
support his conclusion that the amendment should not be permit-
ted because it stated new facts and therefore created a new cause
of action.8 1
In his dissent, Justice Nix also supplemented his argument that
this amendment stated a new cause of action82 with Junk v. East
Fire Department,83 a case also cited by the superior court major-
ity.84 In Junk, the Pennsylvania Superior Court refused to permit
an amendment in an action arising from an intersectional collision
between an ambulance and plaintiff's automobile where the plain-
74. See supra notes 48 and 50.
75. GOOD1UCH-AMRAM 2D § 1019(a):2.
76. Baker v. Rangos, 229 Pa. Super. 333, 349, 324 A.2d 498, 505 (1974).
77. Pittman v. Trent, 30 Som. L.J. 283, 285-86 (1975).
78. 461 A.2d at 602. See also supra notes 50-51.
79. 461 A.2d at 602-03.
80. Id. at 602.
81. Id.
82. Id. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
83. 262 Pa. Super. 473, 396 A.2d 1269 (1978).
84. 300 Pa. Super. at 325-26, 447 A.2d at 637-38.
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tiff sought to amend his complaint after the running of the statute
of limitations to allege negligence on the part of the ambulance
driver in choosing a particular route.85 There, the court said that a
new cause of action arises if the amendment proposes a different
theory or a different kind of negligence than the one previously
raised or if the operative facts supporting the claim are changed.86
Justice Nix used this case to substantiate his claim that since the
amendment proposed by the Connors changed the operative facts
on which their complaint was based, it should be denied. 7 The
majority, although using language almost identical to that in
Junk-that the amendment specified "other ways in which the
appellee was negligent"- 88 ignored Junk completely and permit-
ted the amendment based on its interpretation of what constitutes
amplification under Schaffer and Laursen.89 If the Connor major-
ity believed that the Junk definition of what constitutes a new
cause of action90 was in error, and the majority appears to have
expressed that belief, it should have expressly overruled that deci-
sion. At the very least, the Connor majority should have distin-
guished Junk so as to put to rest any lingering questions about
when a new cause of action arises in an amended complaint.
Clearly, there is some confusion as to whether the phrase "other-
wise failing to use due care and caution under the circumstances"
is narrow enough to constitute a fact such that a defense to it
might be made and yet broad enough to permit an amplification
which avers further actions on the part of the plaintiff which were
not averred in the original complaint. Instead of clarifying when an
amendment to a complaint may be made after the running of the
statute of limitations, the decision in Connor creates more
confusion.
Even though the court in Connor relied heavily on Schaffer and
Laursen to substantiate its position, those cases can be distin-
guished. In Connor, the court was dealing with a "boiler-plate" al-
legation of negligence, 91 whereas in both Laursen and Schaffer the
plaintiffs did not attempt to change the facts involved in the origi-
85. 262 Pa. Super. at 473, 396 A.2d at 1269.
86. Id. at 490-91, 396 A.2d at 1277.
87. 461 A.2d at 603-04.
88. Id. at 602 (emphasis added).
89. 461 A.2d at 602. See supra notes 77, 78, 82 and 83 and accompanying text.
90. See supra note 86.
91. 461 A.2d at 604.
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nal complaint, only the mechanical aspects of the complaint." In
Schaffer, the facts and the negligence alleged remained the same,
the amendment simply averred the reason that the complaint
could not be brought prior to the running of the statute of limita-
tions (i.e., that the facts surrounding the treatment of the plain-
tiff's decedent were in the exclusive knowledge of the defendant-
hospital, which intentionally withheld those facts). 93 In Connor,
while the facts may have been within the sole knowledge of the
defendant, the hospital did not attempt to withhold any facts from
the plaintiff and the plaintiff did not allege that the hospital so
attempted.9 The amendment in Laursen, on the other hand, only
alleged more specifically the dates on which the already averred
negligence occurred (i.e., by listing additional dates)-it did not at-
tempt to allege further or new acts of negligence,96 as did the
plaintiffs in Connor.
The Connor court found it necessary to interpret the averments
of facts in the original complaint, and in so interpreting, make a
determination as to whether those averments encompassed the
facts alleged in the amendment.96 The majority in Connor con-
tended that interpreting the amendment as a mere amplification
was justified because if the defendant did not understand how it
failed to use due care and caution under the circumstances, it
could have moved to strike that portion of the complaint." This,
however, ignores the fact that Pennsylvania common pleas court
cases have denied motions to strike in situations where the aver-
ment sought to be struck was too general to stand on its own, but
was included with more specific averments which in themselves
constituted a cause of action.9 In this area, the common pleas
courts have looked at those general averments as being read to-
gether with the specific averments and although in themselves they
might constitute "catch-all" pleading, the courts have permitted
them to stand with the specific allegations and have denied mo-
92. See supra notes 65 and 70 and accompanying text.
93. 410 Pa. at 404, 189 A.2d at 269. See also supra note 62 and accompanying text.
94. In Connor the record suggests that the defendant supplied the plaintiff with all
information upon request and the plaintiff did not, at any time, make allegations to the
contrary.
95. 494 Pa. 238 at 242, 431 A.2d at 240. See also supra notes 69-70 and accompanying
text.
96. 461 A.2d at 602.
97. Id. at n.3. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
98. See Mikula v. Harrisburg Polyclinic Hospital, 58 Pa. D. & C.2d 125 (1972); Catina
v. Markley, 77 Dauph. 330 (1961). See also infra note 99.
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tions to strike." These decisions indicate that the Connor major-
ity's suggestion that the defendant should have made a motion to
strike the allegation in question was an unrealistic option, since
"catch-all" allegations are designed to be read in context with the
specific allegations. This interpretation of the general averments in
context with the specific averments is apparently based on a gener-
ally held proposition, as well as case law, which provides that the
pleadings will be construed most strictly against the pleader. 100
The result would probably be to deny a plaintiff the opportunity to
expand a "catch-all" allegation to such an extent that it encom-
passes "other ways in which the [defendant] was negligent."' 101 The
majority in Connor also suggested that if the defendant did not
understand how it failed to use due care and caution under the
circumstances, defendant could have made a motion for a more
specific pleading.10 2 While this may be true, it overlooks a critical
99. In Catina the allegation in the original complaint was that the defendant-doctor
"otherwise failed to exercise the degree of skill and care commonly exercised by physicians
and neurosurgeons." The court said:
(1If this were the only averment of negligence, it would fall far short of informing the
defendant of the basis of the plaintiff's charge. But when read in connection with the
eleven specific charges of negligence and with the other paragraphs setting forth in
chronological order the acts complained about, it certainly cannot be said that it is
vague and uninformative. This may be a "catch-all" pleading, but when read in con-
nection with all the other allegations of negligence we do not deem it objectionable.
77 Dauph. at 334-35. The complaint in Mikula alleged, inter alia, that the defendants failed
to observe the current community standards of medical skill and care and further failed to
exercise toward plaintiff's decedent all of the medical techniques known to the medical com-
munity to sustain life and restore some degree of health to a patient. There the court said:
"It is true that [these allegations] are quite general in nature, and we would agree that if
these were the only averment of negligence, they would fall far short of informing defen-
dants of the basis of plaintiff's complaint." 58 Pa. D. & C.2d at 129.
100. See Schwartz v. Manufacturers' Casualty Ins. Co., 335 Pa. 130, 6 A.2d 299 (1939),
and Maguire v. Preferred Realty Co., 257 Pa. 48, 101 A. 100 (1917), in which the respective
courts said that the averments are taken most strongly against the pleader, for he is pre-
sumed to have stated all the facts involved and to have done so as favorably to himself as
his conscience will permit. See also GOODRICH-AMRAM 2D § 1019:1 (pleadings will be con-
strued most strongly against the pleader on the theory that he has stated his case as best he
can; and any conflicts or ambiguities will be interpreted against him); 61 AM. JUR. 2D Plead-
ing § 57 (pleadings are to be construed most strongly against the pleader, and. . . .He may
not leave his pleading open to different constructions, and then take his choice between
them. Therefore, it has been declared that any ambiguity or omission in the pleading must
be at the peril of that party in whose allegation it occurs.); 3 STANDARD PENNSYLVANIA PRAC-
TICE 2D § 16.4 (this rule required that if the language of a pleading is equivocal or suscepti-
ble of two or more meanings, that construction shall be adopted which is most unfavorable
to the party pleading, for he is presumed to have stated the facts involved as favorably to
himself as his conscience would permit).
101. See supra notes 26 and 88 and accompanying text.
102. See supra notes 31 and 32 and accompanying text.
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factor: at the time when the motion for a more specific pleading
would have had to have been made, the plaintiffs did not have the
facts necessary to expand that averment'03 to include the allega-
tions which ultimately surfaced in the proposed amendment. That
being the case, the controverted averment would have been al-
lowed to stand if the court had read it in context with the specific
allegations,'" but the plaintiff would have been denied the oppor-
tunity to recover because she ultimately would not have been able
to prove the originally averred facts. 105
While the Connor court suggested alternative courses of action
open to the defendant, the majority did not seem to consider that
there had been an alternative open to the plaintiff which would
have prevented the present issue from ever arising. In order to gar-
ner the information necessary 0 to formulate a clear and more spe-
cific complaint, the Connors could have availed themselves of pre-
trial discovery, 0 7 which would have permitted them to draft the
complaint properly before the statute of limitations had run. The
Connor court, in ignoring the fact that the Connors had this option
available which would have avoided the necessity of this extended
litigation process, has defeated the purpose of the discovery proce-
dure. Discovery,'0 8 since it has as its purpose to narrow the issues
103. The necessary facts would have been those that would have suggested that there
was a twelve hour delay in removing the barium from the abdominal cavity and that the
barium had some permanent damaging effect.
104. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
105. Those facts being that the hospital had perforated Connor's colon during the bar-
ium enema procedure. See supra notes 6 and 7 and accompanying text.
106. See supra note 103.
107. At the time the suit was filed, the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure
provided:
(a) Any party may take the testimony of any person, including a party, for the pur-
pose of discovery by deposition upon oral examination or written interrogatories of
the identity and whereabouts of witnesses. . . . [T]he deponent may also be ex-
amined regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter
involved in the action and will substantially aid in the preparation of the pleadings or
the preparation or trial of the case.
PA. R. Civ. P. 4007 (this rule was rescinded on November 20, 1978, after the Connors
drafted and filed their original complaint). See also Lapp v. Titus, 224 Pa. Super. 150, 302
A.2d 366 (1973) where the court said:
It is clear that pre-complaint discovery is contemplated and allowed by the Rules of
Civil Procedure .... Discovery by deposition may then be had 20 days thereafter, or
within twenty days with leave of court .... Thus, for the plaintiff without sufficient
facts with which to draw a complaint, discovery within the first twenty days is essen-
tial. Rule 4007 clearly allows such discovery because depositions thereunder are per-
mitted if they will "substantially aid in the preparation of the pleadings."
Id. at 155, 302 A.2d at 369.
108. See supra note 107. PA. R. Civ. P. 4007 has since been replaced in part, by Rules
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for trial and to obtain the necessary information to prepare a
proper pleading,10 9 would have been the best avenue open to the
plaintiffs in preparing their complaint. If the plaintiffs had com-
pleted discovery, and still did not understand the ramifications of
the information which they had received," 0 it should not have
been up to the court to provide them with additional opportunities
to prepare their case where those opportunities clearly prejudice
the defendant.
The Connor court could also have examined another option
which was available to the Connors in preparing their complaint.
The plaintiffs had available to them, in formulating their com-
plaint, the opportunity to allege that the material facts necessary
to properly draft a complaint were exclusively within the posses-
sion of the defendant."' Where such an allegation has been clearly
made, the courts have not required as much specificity in the
pleadings.'12 This option is particularly attractive in medical mal-
4001 and 4003.1. Under Rule 4001(c), "any party may take the testimony of any person,
including a party, by deposition upon oral examination or written interrogatories for the
purpose of discovery, or for preparation of pleadings, or for preparation or trial of a
case ..." (emphasis added). PA. R. Civ. P. 4001(c). Rule 4003.1 provides:
[A] party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is rele-
vant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the
claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other
party, including the existence, description, nature, content, custody, condition and
location of any books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and loca-
tion of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter.
PA. R. Civ. P. 4003.1.
109. See Little v. Sebastian, 50 Pa. D. & C.2d 761 (Lebanon 1970), where the court
said: "We believe that the objects of a proper discovery procedure are to first, narrow the
issues; second, obtain evidence to be used at the trial of the issues; third, secure information
as to the existence and source of evidence that may be used at trial; and fourth, to obtain
the necessary information to prepare proper pleadings." Id. at 766.
110. It may have been easier, in the present case, for the plaintiffs to clearly under-
stand the possible ramifications of the information which they ultimately received from the
defendants, had they procured the services of a physician who was an expert in the particu-
lar field of medicine which was at issue. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
111. See Fentini v. Ruginis, 52 Schuy. Leg. Rec. 6, 8 (1956) ("plaintiff in his complaint
should disclose for the information of the defendant the essential facts to enable the defen-
dant to make a proper defense, and that if facts lie as much within the knowledge of the
defendant as of the plaintiff, less precision is required in averring them"); Corkill v. Ferrar,
45 Schuy. Leg. Rec. 150, 152 (1949) ("[t]he law is correctly set forth, 'no one is required to
plead facts of which he has no knowledge, where these same facts are within the knowledge
of the opposing party' ").
112. See Line Lexington Lumber & Millwork Co. v. Pennsylvania Publishing Corp.,
451 Pa. 154, 162, 301 A.2d 684, 689 (1973) ("[o]n the other hand, where crucial facts are in
the exclusive knowledge of defendant, and plaintiff so pleads, he should be given considera-
ble latitude"). See also 71 C.J.S. Pleadings § 6, GOODRICH-AMRAM 2D § 1019:1, 4 STANDARD
PENNSYLVANIA PRACTICE 2D § 21:31.
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practice where, as in Connor, the plaintiff does not have the requi-
site facts for clearly stating a cause of action in his complaint.113
By its decision in Connor, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court cre-
ated a situation which has the potential to extend the litigation
process by permitting amendments under "catch-all" or "boiler-
plate" allegations in the complaint. The effect is to create a two-
part ritual. Plaintiffs will include this type of allegation in their
complaints, hoping that if need be, they will be permitted to
amend their complaints at a later date. Defendants, on guard for
this type of allegation, will move to strike or make a motion for a
more specific pleading. The greatest harm is that it permits sloppy
pleading by a plaintiff, who may then later, at the expense of the
defendant, be permitted to amend his complaint to state what is
essentially a new cause of action.'
1 4
The Connor result suggests that the Pennsylvania courts are
leaning toward an adoption of the federal notice pleading system.
Indeed, in his superior court dissent, Judge Cirillo noted that since
the matters alleged in the amended complaint took place on the
same day and in the same place, Allegheny General Hospital had
notice of the events from the very day of the incident."5
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the issue in Connor
would not have arisen. The federal rules require only a "short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief."116 The parties then possess liberal opportunity for discov-
113. See Hagerty v. Latrobe Area Hospital, 53 Pa. D. & C.2d 191, 193 (Westmoreland
1971):
The malpractice type cases are not so common as to give plaintiff's counsel the confi-
dence in the preparation of a complaint he might have in preparing a complaint
based say on a collision of two automobiles at an intersection. The allegation of negli-
gence against a doctor in the highly specialized field of medicine presents problems
real or imagined, which the drafter of a complaint in trespass could very well feel
demands a cautious and detailed approach in order to protect his client's interest.
This could result in a lengthy and perhaps repetitious complaint. If such a result
occurs, we cannot fault a plaintiff so long as the defendant is not prejudiced thereby.
Id.
114. The risk, after Connor, is that a proposed amendment will be interpreted as an
amplification of that "boiler-plate" allegation of negligence when it, as in Connor, comes
dangerously close to stating a new cause of action.
115. 300 Pa. Super. at 330, 446 A.2d at 640 (Cirillo, J., dissenting). Judge Cirillo
stated: "Additionally, the matters alleged by the appellants in their amended complaint
were part of a causally related chain of events which occurred on the same day, November
26, 1973, and at the same place, Allegheny General Hospital. The hospital had notice of
these events from the very day of this incident and, therefore, was not prejudiced in its
defense by the amended complaint." Id.
116. FEn. R. Civ. P. 8
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ery, to disclose more precisely the basis of the claim and to define
more narrowly the disputed facts and issues."'
Under the notice pleading system of the federal rules, the result
in Connor would have been the same,11 8 but the litigation would
not have required the additional years' spent on deciding the is-
sue of whether the amendment could be made. Federal Rule 15(c)
provides that whenever the claim or defense asserted in the
amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction or occur-
rence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original plead-
ing, the amendment relates back to the date of the original plead-
ing.12 0 Since the transaction or occurrence in Connor would have
been the stay in the hospital, all that would have been necessary
for the plaintiff to allege was that she was injured by the negli-
gence of the hospital during her confinement thereto. Through the
process of discovery' both parties would then have had an oppor-
tunity to narrow the issues involved to the point that any alleged
acts of negligence by the hospital were so clear that the defendant
might be able to prepare to defend against the allegation.1
2
If the purpose of the decision in Connor is to liberalize the re-
quirements of fact pleading and in effect bring some facets of the
Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure in line with the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, perhaps it would have been better for the
court simply to adopt the Federal Rules instead of creating confu-
sion in the fact pleading system with this gradual change. The su-
preme court has the power to prescribe rules governing proce-
dure,12  and to the extent that the court intends to make such
changes in the rules, it may have been the better course for the
117. See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37.
118. The result being that the court would have permitted the amendment and the
Connors' case would have gone to trial on the merits. At the time of this writing, the ques-
tion of the liability of Allegheny General Hospital has not yet been litigated.
119. Note that the complaint was filed on October 15, 1975; the motion to amend was
made on November 26, 1979, and the amendment was granted on April 27, 1983. It took
three and one half years to resolve the issue of whether or not to permit the amendment
under the Pennsylvania system.
120. FED R. Civ. P. 15(c).
121. See supra note 117.
122. See supra notes 46, 48 and 50 and accompanying text.
123. The Pennsylvania Constitution provides: "The Supreme Court shall have the
power to prescribe general rules governing practice, procedure and the conduct of all courts
S.. if such rules are consistent with this Constitution and neither abridge, enlarge nor mod-
ify the substantive right of any litigant . . ." PA. CONST. art. 5, § 10(c).
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court to make the change in a clear decisive manner-not a little
at a time.
If it were done when 'tis done, then 'twere well
It were done quickly.""
Cynthia E. Kernick
124. W. SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH, Act I, Sc. vii, 1.

